remain relevant today. In expressing caution about the future of Chinese legal reforms, Professor Chiu noted that, -[b]oth socialist and traditional theories put emphasis on order over freedom, duties over rights, and group interests over individual ones.‖ 1 This assessment of the Chinese legal order remains as true today as it was then.
I teach civil procedure, a seemingly technical area. But it is procedure and the promise of regular and consistent process in enforcing legal norms and a method to check arbitrary powers that underlie the -rule of law.‖ Free market reformers have long argued that a predictable and consistent legal system established to support markets will also inevitably lead to rule of law and a more democratic state. 2 A democratic state, they argue, promotes greater inclusiveness not only in lawmaking but also in law enforcement. 3 Courts are seen as public places where citizens can adjust top-down dictates to bottom-level realities, and participate in the shaping of norms applicable to everyday life. 4 The United States, for example, with its historic distrust of government authorities, has entrusted private civil litigants with the role of enforcing certain legal norms and civil litigation as one vehicle in developing public norms. With this broader public function for civil litigation, American civil procedure developed to accommodate easier access to courts for individual citizens and give great autonomy to parties in court to shape, develop, and prove their litigation. 5 To what extent does China challenge the above assumptions regarding the public and possibly democratic role of the courts? In recent years, China has experimented with participatory lawmaking by opening its laws for comment and citizen participation. 6 Similarly, China has also seen an increase in private citizen law enforcement due to a dramatic increase in recent decades in the rate of civil litigation. 7 But much like the policies it has pursued in the economic sphere, the Chinese state retains substantial discretion and control over the form and manner of legal development, 8 not to mention its control over legal institutions, including the process of litigation. 9 The developmental state is characterized by deep state involvement in economic development and, in the case of China, extends to legal developments such as guiding major litigation and resolution of socially significant disputes, even when those disputes are between private parties. 10 One recent mass tort case not only illustrates Professor Chiu's prognosis that the Chinese legal system will continue to put -emphasis on order over freedom, duties over rights, and group interests over individual ones,‖ 11 but also how the legal system accommodates the state's role and the development of a multi-track litigation system. 
I. THE ARMILLARISIN A CASE 12
In April 2006, shortly after taking Armillarisin A injections, a medication used to treat gallstones and gastritis, patients in the Third Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-sen University 13 (Hospital) in Guangzhou City began to suffer from acute renal failure. 14 Qiqihaer the Second Pharmaceuticals Limited (Qiqihaer Pharmaceuticals) produced the injections, and Guangdong Medicines and Health Products (Guangdong Medicines) distributed them under an agreement with Jinhengyuan, another distributor. 15 After discovering these patient injuries, the Hospital stopped using the medicine and reported what they had found to the Center for ADR Monitoring, the government entity responsible for monitoring the quality and safety of medicine in China. 16 The central government immediately created an investigative team, while the local government gathered an expert panel. 17 The panel concluded that Armillarisin A injections had negatively impacted those patients with acute renal failure and neurologic lesions, agreeing with the Hospital's suspicions. 18 20 The government launched a criminal prosecution, during which -one of the defendants made the surprising admission that Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals had bribed officials to obtain a Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certificate.‖ 21 As a result of the defective drug, close to 65 patients sustained renal failure, 14 of whom died with one patient in critical condition. 22 Reflecting their dependence on the developmental state, parties injured by the contaminated medicine turned first to the Chinese government, rather than the courts, for relief. Responding to the clamor for relief from the 60 injured patients, the provincial government formed a coordinating team to mediate the claims. 23 Eventually, the team asked the Hospital to compensate the patients; over 40 eventually settled. 24 While the course of this dispute on the surface may have parallels in the U.S. system, there are distinctive differences traceable to the Chinese preference for -order over freedom, duties over rights and group interest over individual ones.‖ For one, the almost immediate turn to government-led mediation represents a continuing emphasis on -order over freedom,‖ even in light of twenty years of legal reform towards greater legal formality.
A. "Order over Freedom"
Beginning in the 1980s and continuing in the '90s, Chinese civil justice grew both in greater professionalization of the judiciary and greater formalism in civil justice with an emphasis on adjudication over mediation. While -[i] 27 With an emphasis on adjudication for civil cases in the 1990s, there was also a corresponding shift in the responsibility to gather evidence from judges to litigants and an emphasis on party autonomy. 28 In many ways, Chinese legal reforms took on the patina of the adversary system and the independent civil litigation process. 29 Chinese citizens flocked to the courts and litigation rates rose dramatically in the 1990s. 30 But formal adjudication did not, according to some, provide an effective forum for the resolution of the growing social conflict. As the economic boom in China resulted in greater disparities in power and income, there was greater social unrest, an increase in letters or visits of complaint, known as xinfang (a method of petitioning seeking relief from governmental entities), and also, for reviews of cases even after final appeals to governmental entities and courts. 31 -harmonious society‖ in an effort to stem this tide of social unrest. 32 The president of the Supreme People's Court, placing blame on the courts in failing to end disputes, followed suit and strongly encouraged people's courts to -mediate cases that could be mediated, adjudicate cases that should be adjudicated, combining mediation with adjudication, concluding the case and ending the dispute concurrently.‖ 33 The message was that the ultimate goal is to end disputes, preserve harmony, and adjudication is merely one avenue, not necessarily the preferred avenue, towards the achievement of this goal. 34 While Chinese mediation remained commonly used for family and neighborhood disputes, even throughout the 1990s reform period, it was because they require the personal knowledge or understanding of the local residence/mediation committee. By contrast, litigation had been touted for arms-length economic disputes involving property or commerce. 35 However, in the recent turn to mediation, the concern for stability has led to a strategy of government-based mediation even for economic disputes and in particular, for mass torts and collective actions.
Significantly, in 2006, the Supreme People's Court identified selected categories of cases for enhanced mediation. These include cases of great public interest requiring the collaboration of the government and other relevant departments; class actions; complicated cases in which the parties' relationship is very tense and neither of the parties has a stronger case according to evidence; cases involving matters not governed by any legislation; very sensitive cases and cases of great social concern; and reviews of petitions and retrials. 36 -great social concern.‖ 37 Collective actions and joint tort litigation are now viewed as potentially destabilizing to society and discouraged both by Chinese courts' refusal to accept these cases and the imposition of stricter requirements for lawyers in taking on such cases. 38 Instead, for mass torts cases, mediation can take place with or without the request of the parties and by governmental departments rather than through the -neutrality‖ of a formal court process. 39 In the Armillarisin A case described above, the first course of action was the formation of a government-led mediation group. The mediation working group was composed of members of the provincial ministry of justice, the public health division, the public security division, and the letters and petitions division. 40 Despite the fact that the Hospital might not have been the party who caused the injury, the group directed the Hospital to mediate with and, if appropriate, to compensate the victims. 41 This reflected the government's focus on victim compensation, rather than -adjudication of right and wrong.‖ 42 With these priorities in mind, the Hospital had no choice but to negotiate with the victims. 43 This bifurcated process (that is, steering major cases towards mediation while allowing formal justice to run its course in run-ofthe-mill cases) has been utilized for other major cases such as those arising out of the Szechuan earthquake and the Sanlu milk contamination scandal. 44 In both incidents, Chinese courts again refused to accept the cases and instead relied on the executive branch to step in to negotiate, mediate, and ultimately broker settlements. 45 For example, in the Sanlu contaminated milk powder incident, the estimated 300,000 injured victims similarly had their claims quickly and quietly resolved through apology and financial compensation. 46 The entire mediation was accomplished in less than a year. On September 16, 2008, the state inspection services announced that contaminated milk had been sold. 47 In December 2008, the criminal prosecution of relevant parties occurred (the former chairwoman of Sanlu pled guilty) 48 and on January 8, 2009, the Sanlu company paid 132 million yuan into a fund set up by the government for the victims of the tainted milk. 49 In total, the Sanlu families received about 200,000 yuan ($29,200) for the death of a child, 30,000 yuan ($4,400) for children suffering more serious injuries, and 2,000 yuan ($300) for less serious cases. 50 More than 95% of the injured families have accepted compensation of this type. 51 Those who participated in government mediation were denied access to Chinese courts. 52 Chinese scholars touted -the completeness of this resolution: for the victims' families; for the companies involved, which have avoided bankruptcy; and for society at large, for which the disruption of economic and social stability has been mitigated.‖ 53
Certainly, government-led compensation efforts also happen in the United States. The U.S. federal government has stepped in to resolve compensation questions in instances of mass disasters such as the compensation fund established for victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and for victims of the BP oil spill in The stated rationales for these funds have alternated between a need to mitigate the economic impact of mass torts and to compensate victims in the absence of an identifiable culprit. Ultimately, the 9/11 fund was viewed as an expression of national grief and, therefore, unique and limited in its application. 55 In most other mass tort cases between private parties, however, the United States will typically leave the resolution to the neutral forum of the judicial process.
By contrast, concerns for stability and social unrest have led the Chinese government to take a more affirmative role in resolving and mediating mass tort cases as an initial matter rather than allow litigation. This is true even when the case is between two identifiable private parties and there is relatively little economic impact. 56 In China, it is a top-down state policy of enhanced mediation for mass cases. The resurgence and embrace of mediation, particularly stateinitiated mediation, can be directly traced to the Chinese state's concern for stability and order rather than an individual's right to bring litigation. 57 In sum, while the 1980s and ‗90s saw the reformation of the civil courts and the implementation of formal process, more recent decades have seen a resurgence of mediatory justice. 58 The greater affirmation of adjudication in the 1990s may be a response to the increase in commercial disputes between strangers due to market Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 as part of a scheme to prevent the airline industry's collapse in the wake of 9/11, allowing victims to receive compensation from the government only if they agreed not to sue the airlines); Frequently Asked Questions, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq#Q1 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (describing how after White House involvement, BP replaced its original claims facility and created a new escrow facility which, although funded by BP, is administered by a neutral third party).
55 reforms and the need for more formal adjudication. 59 In those years, Chinese courts were given greater breathing space to decide cases between two private parties. 60 There were even nascent efforts by the Supreme People's Court to reinterpret national legislation in order to empower courts to deal with complicated civil cases. 61 However, a more conservative trend has since emerged that focuses on social harmony and stability. Chinese scholars and judges are rediscovering the virtues of mediation, including its efficiency, cost effectiveness, and humanity. 62 The Supreme People's Court, in a series of judicial interpretations, has steered particular -socially significant‖ cases towards mediation, with or without a litigant's consent. 63 Mediation may provide such harmony, but it can also downplay the litigant's freedom of choice. 64 And so, the preference of mediation over adjudication in China is also a preference for maintaining -order over freedom.‖
B. "Duties over Rights"
Where mediation fails, litigation begins. If the litigation is -socially significant,‖ the Chinese state remains involved both to shape the issues and to ensure the presence of the appropriate parties. 65 In the Armillarisin A injections case, eleven patients and their families filed lawsuits against the Hospital instead of settling their claims through government-sponsored mediation. 66 The other ten patients and their families refrained from the litigation, but closely followed the ongoing trial. 67 While the plaintiffs' injuries were the result of counterfeit medicine, the Hospital was named as the sole defendant in the lawsuit, rather than the pharmaceutical manufacturer. 68 In response, the Hospital argued that it was not legally liable since it had followed all appropriate laws pertaining to the utilization of Armillarisin A. 69 The Hospital also maintained that it was the first to discover the problem and further, that it had promptly reported the issue. 70 Therefore, the Hospital contended that the manufacturers of Armillarisin A, not the Hospital, should be legally responsible for the effects of the product. 71 For these reasons, the Hospital requested permission from the court to join manufacturer Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals, and the distributors, Jinhengyuan and Guangdong Medicines, as defendants in the lawsuits. 72 The plaintiffs protested, arguing that they -had the right of action,‖ which included the right to determine which defendants to sue, and that both the Hospital's application of joinder and the Court's decision to grant it therefore compromised those rights. 73 In an interview, the plaintiff's attorney explained that joinder in this case would have negative consequences, such as lengthier litigation delaying timely compensation to the plaintiffs. 74 In June 2007, however, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs, ordering that the two sellers and manufacturers be joined as defendants. 75 The ability of the Chinese court to bring in new defendants absent consent of the plaintiffs underscores the perennial tension between the preference for substantive justice and respect for party autonomy. 76 The right of the defendants to join interested parties not initially included a lawsuit is a situation that every legal system must address. 77 For example, in the United States, where party autonomy is the persons-in-charge had been prosecuted. As a result, the company was not in a position to make compensation. For another, since there was no direct relationship between the plaintiffs and the pharmaceutical sellers, joinder of these defendants would lead to protracted litigation and ultimately would not result in timely compensation to the plaintiffs. 79 The plaintiff may choose to sue one joint tortfeasor and not the other. The defendant's job is to deny and defend the plaintiff's claim against it, and if necessary, himself pursue against the other tortfeasor for contribution. The court's job is to ensure a level playing field. As noted by Stephen Burbank, the structure of American litigation is very much left to the parties, particularly to plaintiffs, as to whom they wants to sue. 80 By contrast, in China, joinder of defendants appears to be less restrictive, less dependent on the will of plaintiffs, and more reliant on perceptions of efficiency and substantive justice. This sense of who should be brought into an action can override the plaintiff's right of autonomy over the lawsuit. Article 119 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Code states simply that -If a party who must participate in a joint action fails to participate in the proceedings, the people's court shall notify him to participate.‖ 81 The rule gives the court discretion to join necessary parties with or without request from the litigants. When a defendant requests joinder, the court may also order it if, after investigation, the court finds the request to have a basis. 82 In the Armillarisin A case, the court concluded that this is a case of necessary joint action and that the existing defendant, the Hospital, had the right to demand joinder of the other parties, and that the court could join the other defendants even without the consent of the plaintiffs. 83 Much to the parties' dismay, however, rather than dismissing the case against the Hospital, the court maintained the Hospital as a defendant in the case. 84 The court reasoned that -it could fully adjudicate responsibly only if all of the possible obligors were joined to the lawsuits.‖ 85
See generally
But it is unclear how the Hospital could be viewed as a joint tortfeasor since it merely administered the medicine and was in no way involved in its manufacture or distribution. 86 Indeed, the Hospital pointed out that the pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors were the real parties in interest. 87 The pharmaceutical producers maintained control of the counterfeit medicines before they were used by the plaintiffs. 88 The Hospital also noted that, pursuant to Chinese laws and regulations, it is both the producers and the sellers who were obligated to maintain the quality of pharmaceuticals during distribution and the injuries caused by counterfeit medicines were the result of the failure of both the producers and the sellers to fulfill these obligations. 89 Consequently, the Hospital argued that under Chinese tort law, 90 the producers and sellers were the actual interested persons, not the Hospital. 91 The court, therefore, could have decided to dismiss the case against the Hospital. 92
Indeed, it is only with a broad reading of Chinese tort law and liberal application of Chinese joinder rules in the context of promoting a -harmonious society‖ could the court have kept the Hospital in the case. 93 This appears to be true, as in fact, the Supreme People's Court has explained that, in personal injury compensation cases, all joint tortfeasors shall be made defendants when the plaintiff sues only some of them. 94 joinder rule, explaining that a necessary -joint action‖ can arise when there are one or more claims involving common rights and obligations as well as several parties who must initiate or respond to a lawsuit together. 95 A determination that the claims should be tried as -necessary joint actions‖ may simply mean that the court cannot adjudicate them separately. 96 This is a broad view of -joint actions‖ consistent with the approach of Chinese tort law, which emphasizes both rights and responsibilities, rather than rights as either a sword or shield. 97 In the Amarmillarism A case, there are several further explanations as to why the court kept the Hospital in the litigation. The court may have believed that by joining the parties and ensuring that all interested persons were brought into the action, the court could better determine the facts, the responsible parties, and their respective liabilities. In this way, substantial justice would be more efficiently done, even if the litigation did not proceed in exactly the manner as anticipated by the plaintiffs. Alternatively, the court may have believed that the Hospital owed a duty to the plaintiffs, whether it was a legal or a moral one, such that the Hospital should be made answerable to the plaintiff. With either justification we see the emphasis of -duty over rights‖ playing out in this litigation through the Chinese court's affirmative efforts to shape the litigation.
C. "Group Interest over Individual Interests"
Finally, the court in the Armillarisin A cases, having brought in all possible defendants, proceeded to hold all of them liable for plaintiffs' injuries. 98 By appearing to impose collective liability rather than determine individual culpability in its attempt to resolve the dispute, the court's ruling appeared to go beyond the requirements of China's products liability law. As discussed above, Chinese products liability law imposes the burden on the pharmaceutical manufacturer and distributors to prove that they had carried out their responsibilities regarding Armillarisin A. Article 41 the 2000 Product Quality Law specifies that manufacturers are liable for injuries caused by defective products unless they can prove one of the following: 1) they did not put the defective product into circulation; 2) defects later found did not exist at the time the product was put into circulation; or 3) the defects could not have been detected at the time of their release due to scientific or technological reasons. 100 Meanwhile, Article 42 of the same act provides that sellers will be liable for injury caused by defective products unless they can prove: 1) they are not at fault for the damages caused by the defective goods; and 2) they can identify the manufacturer and other suppliers of the product. 101 Finally, Article 35 of the Pharmaceutical Administration Regulations requires that -a pharmaceutical wholesale enterprise perform a quality examination on medicines purchased for the first time from a pharmaceutical producer.‖ 102
In the Armillarisin A case, the manufacturer (Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals) did not respond to the lawsuit or appear in court, let alone provide evidence that the company had satisfied the requirements of Article 41. 103 The distributor, Jinhengyuan, which bought the medicine directly from Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals, admitted in court that because of inexperience, it did not conduct a quality inspection of the medicine. 104 The other distributor, Guangdong Medicines, signed a sales contract with Jinhengyuan but received the medicine directly from Qiqihar, and admitted that upon receipt it only examined such items as outer packages and sale documents. 105 As could be expected, the court found the manufacturer, Qiqihar Pharmaceuticals, liable for failing to satisfy the requirements of Article 41 of the Product Liability Law, and the distributors, Jinhengyuan and Guangdong Medicines, liable as wholesale enterprises for failing to conduct proper examinations on the medicine. 106 The court believed that, if the manufacturer or the distributor had carried out its responsibilities of quality control, the counterfeit medicine would never have entered the market or gone into the Hospital. 107 The Hospital maintained that it did not have the same responsibility for quality control as that prescribed to the manufacturer and the distributors. 108 Instead, the Hospital argued that its only obligation was to abide by the administrative regulations for public bidding but since Guangdong Medicine had won the public bidding for Armillarisin A organized by the provincial government, all hospitals within the province were forced to purchase the medicine from Guangdong Medicine. 109 The court rejected the Hospital's argument and instead, imposed joint liability on the Hospital, together with the manufacturer and distributors. 110 It was unclear what action taken by the Hospital could be pinpointed to as unlawful or so closely connected to the manufacturer and distributor's actions as to constitute liability. The court subsequently explained that the Hospital was held liable because the Hospital constitutes a -seller‖ and therefore bears faultbased liability. In the alternative, the Hospital was also held under -strict liability‖ or no-fault liability under the General Principles of the Civil Code. 111 The Hospital, however, pointed out that the General Principles of the Civil Code only provides for -strict liability‖ liability if the underlying substantive law so specified, (that -civil liability shall be borned [sic] even in the absence of fault, if the law so stipulates,‖) and the Products Quality Law places responsibility on sellers only for the defects they cause. 112 Yet, the court's imposition of liability on the Hospital may nevertheless be consistent with how Chinese courts have interpreted Chinese substantive tort law, and with broad collective liability. In -Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court of Some Issues Concerning the Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury,‖ the Supreme People's Court has specified that liability shall be imposed if the -injurious acts are directly combined and result in the same injury consequence even if there is no joint intent or joint negligence.‖ 114 This same opinion also made clear that where two or more persons have no joint intent or joint negligence, but separately commit several acts that are indirectly combined and result in the same injury, they shall bear corresponding compensation liabilities respectively in appropriate proportions upon the extent of their faults. 115 In holding the Hospital liable, the court in the Armillarisin A case must have concluded that either the acts of all four defendants combined to produce a single injury to each plaintiff or that the defendants' separate acts were so closely connected that it was impossible to ascertain what share of the damage each defendant inflicted. But if the Hospital's sole role was to apply the injections as instructed, the court could have viewed that service as a separate act distinct from the manufacturer or seller's liability. The court could have declined to hold the Hospital liable, or at least only hold the Hospital responsible for its respective portion of liability. Significantly, even the plaintiffs admitted in court that they never blamed the Hospital for the medical services received and that their claim was one based on the infringement of product quality. 116 It is only by reading broad collective liability into Chinese tort law and applying that liability liberally that the court could hold the Hospital liable.
Finally, one additional factor may have affected the court's ruling on liability. Given the criminal prosecution of the manufacturer and the relatively small size of the distributor and seller companies, the Hospital was the sole defendant financially able to provide relief to the plaintiffs. 117 seen as an attempt to provide redistributive and substantive justice for the injured plaintiffs. 118 It may also reflect a sense of group obligation, and the concern of providing group relief for these plaintiffs, over and above the sense of individual liability. 119 And so, it can still be said that Chinese law emphasizes -order over freedom, duties over rights, and group interests over individual ones.‖
II. THE PATH OF CHINESE LEGAL REFORMS
Even as Chinese law continues to emphasize -order over freedom, duties over rights, and group interests over individual ones,‖ 120 the inquiry cannot end there. Equally important, one must ask who is defining the nature of this -order over freedom,‖ the identity of which -duties‖ should prevail over which -rights,‖ and what -group interests‖ override -individual ones.‖ The answer for China is inevitably the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 121 To understand legal reform in China, one must take into account the role of the CCP as the driving force for the Chinese developmental state and how its involvement in legal reforms has resulted in the latest turn-one that establishes a multi-track litigation system, in which minor and relatively insignificant cases are mediated, commercial cases are adjudicated, and mass cases are carefully controlled and shaped by the Chinese state (as exemplified by the Amarillarism A litigation). 122 The most recent discussions on the amendments to the Chinese procedural codes reveal efforts to codify just such a strategy.
This multi-track strategy to civil litigation is yet the latest phase in the history of Chinese legal reform. One could even say that it is a response to deficiencies created by the privatization of the legal profession coupled with greater formality. 123 As discussed earlier, for a time in the mid-1990s, the Chinese state encouraged the use of the courts in the hopes that the courts could assist in stabilizing society and serve as a neutral forum for litigants trying to rein in local bureaucrats. 124 Speaking at the landmark national civil justice conference held between December 1978 and January 1979, Jiang Hua, the former President of the Supreme People's Court, spoke of the necessity and legitimacy of civil justice, positioned the Supreme People's Court to take the lead in judicial administration, and started to assert the Supreme People's Court's institutional autonomy. 125 After the conference, Chinese legal reformers enhanced their efforts at procedural and institutional change while the Supreme People's Court decreed that Chinese courts should -further improve the work of trying civil cases, protect the civil rights and interests of citizens and legal persons according to the law, and promote the just, safe, civilized, and healthy development of society.‖ 126
For the next twenty years, China was determined to develop a professional legal system, leaving the particular design of civil justice to the expertise of the judiciary. 127 More law schools were established and qualifications for both lawyers and judges were both strengthened and clarified. 128 In a series of Five Year Plans, the Supreme People's Court reduced the inquisitorial and investigative role of judges while simultaneously increasing the responsibility of parties to produce evidence and prove their case. 129 During this period, Chinese judicial reformers urged the development of civil courts that would play a more general, public, and normative role in applying and proclaiming rules. 130 Yet, in many ways, such efforts limited citizen's empowerment even as they added to it. Legal markets created great disparities in the availability of legal services between rich and poor; formal procedures increased the alienation and burdens of poor litigants such that they were unable to access the judicial system. 131 Facing pressure from the international community as well as the needs of a market economy, the Chinese state had applied market principles to the provision of legal services. But in the short run, the creation of a legal market has not led to greater access to justice. While China now has more than 15,888 law firms with 155,457 fulltime lawyers, or one lawyer for every 8,586 people, 132 fully 85 percent of licensed lawyers work in large or medium sized cities, leaving only a small percentage to serve the vast population in rural areas. 133 Equally problematic, lawyers are unevenly distributed, not only with more lawyers in the cities than in the countryside, but also in the matters they handle. 134 Lawyers tend to enter the more lucrative areas of commerce rather than the less lucrative areas of family law, debt, and employment. 135 With the latter being areas of greatest concern to ordinary citizens, there exists a tremendous gap in the availability of services between the urban rich and the rural poor.
Similar resource disparities exist within the Chinese courts. The different levels of economic development among the provinces are reflected in the disparate resources provided to judges and local courts. 136 Until recently, local governments, rather than the central government, appointed and paid Chinese judges, subjecting Chinese courts to the whims of local government budgets. Poor provinces with limited resources, such as Hubei, Guizhou, and Sichuan, even lacked physical court facilities and faced shortages of judicial manpower. 137 Recognizing this disparity of resources between different provinces, the Chinese state has recently begun efforts to distribute funds directly from the central government budget. 138 Until that reform is fully implemented, however, judicial resources are still deficient in many provinces.
This scarcity of lawyers and judges proved to be a huge problem particularly as China increasingly formalized its litigation procedures.
In an effort to -modernize‖ and to alleviate the burgeoning workload of Chinese judges, the Chinese state moved away from a civil law inquisitorial system toward rules that relieve Chinese judges from the burden of investigation and impose on litigants the burden of coming forward with evidence. 139 Absent the assistance of judges to investigate and gather evidence, poor litigants need legal representation more than ever and without it, are at the mercy of litigants with greater economic resources.
Due to all of the above factors-a lack of lawyers, a lack of judges and an increased burden on unrepresented litigants, public discontent with the courts has mounted. 140 Grievance petitions filed with the Chinese state have skyrocketed: many of these petitions deal with litigants dissatisfied with court treatment. 141 In a number of areas, we are seeing the next phase of Chinese legal reforms as the Chinese state tightens its control over the courts and over the process of civil litigation. This can be seen in the latest set of proposed amendments to the Chinese Civil Procedure Code.
On June 10, 2011, the Central Committee Legislative Affairs Bureau posted draft revisions to the Chinese Civil Procedure Code. 142 The Chinese Civil Procedure Code was initially promulgated in 1982 for trial implementation, formally enacted in 1991, and most recently amended in 2007. 143 However, the ever increasing number of civil lawsuits and the over-burdened Chinese trial courts have since led to discussions of yet another round of changes to the Civil Procedure Code. 144 The 2011 draft amendments are designed to address some of the country's concerns with social instability, the increased workload of Chinese judges, and the external pressures of a World Trade Organization (WTO) treaty regime that urges greater access to justice and greater transparency of the courts. 145 Most significantly, the proposed amendments would codify the multi-track approach to cases. 146 First and foremost, the proposed amendments to the Chinese Civil Procedure Code would formalize the emphasis on mediation as an effective mechanism for resolving disputes, noting that -suitable cases should first be mediated.‖ 147 New subsections would also be added to protect the integrity of mediated agreements. 148 Litigants may apply for enforcement of extra-judicial mediated agreements by the courts, so long as the agreement is filed with the courts within 30 days of the agreement. 149 Under the amended rules, a civil court may, after investigation, enforce the agreement or require the parties to mediate again, if it finds the agreement unlawful. 150 Along with mediation, the revisions would also make clear that simplified procedures are to be used for many civil cases in which the facts are relatively undisputed and the amount in controversy is not large. One new proposed amendment would require that simple cases with a value below 5,000 RMB be limited to one trial only. 151 A second amendment would expand the simplified procedures' parameters. 152 In addition to requiring some simple cases to use simplified procedures, parties themselves could agree to the use of simplified procedures. 153 Finally, a third amendment would require that cases from the basic people's court and those sent out from the trial courts use more convenient methods to summon litigants, deliver documents, and try cases, but in all cases protect the litigants' rights and opinions. 154 Second, responding to the problem of courts refusing to accept complaints, particularly in difficult and socially significant cases, the proposed revisions would secure a litigant's right to file a complaint and to present evidence. Drafters of the revisions added a new clause to Article 111 155 which would require a court to accept a filed case meeting the requirements of Article 118. 156 The court's decision whether to accept a case must be made within seven days and litigants are notified of their right to appeal an adverse decision. 157 Similarly, to implement a litigant's right to present evidence, these articles specify the timing and procedure for the receipt of evidence. Under the proposed amendments, a court must accept the evidence offered by a party and must record under court seal the type of evidence presented, the number of pages, the time of receipt, and the length of the presentation. 158 The new amendments also focus on the pretrial conference, at which the parties would focus on the major points in dispute, the nature of the evidence to be presented at trial, and the identification of points of agreement that would enable the parties to simplify the trial. 159 Third, in lieu of not accepting cases, these proposed articles set out the process by which Chinese judges would decide in the very initial stages of the litigation how to track civil cases. The People's Court must assess and track the case to one of the following possibilities: 1) an expedited procedure (du cu) translated loosely as -supervised procedure‖ if the case, such as a debt case, has few or no factual disputes; 2) a mediation, if the litigants' disputes are more substantial; 3) a simplified procedure or ordinary procedure, according to the needs of the case; and/or 4) a procedure for litigants to exchange evidence to clarify the points of dispute for cases that require a trial. 160 The goal is that such tracking will leave very few cases for full adjudication and trial. It is through a multi-tracked system that litigation will be contained.
As for socially significant cases, the revisions also grapple with a citizen's right to bring these cases with a broader social impact. In recent years, Chinese courts have discouraged group litigation. In 2006, the All-China Lawyers Association even issued a -guiding opinion‖ instructing law firms to assign only -politically qualified‖ lawyers to cases involving ten or more litigants. Fears of instability have led courts to withdraw from group litigation. The proposed procedural revisions, however, recognize the need to expand standing for public interest cases beyond those who have sustained a direct injury to include relevant governmental organs and civil society organizations. 161 In consumer protection and environmental cases, these entities may have standing to file suit on behalf of the public interest. 162 Finally, the new provisions would also expand supervision over the courts. Prosecutors in China have the unique authority to supervise judicial work that is distinct from the role of appellate courts in reviewing cases. The current civil procedure code provides for one prosecutorial supervision method (kansu) under which an upper level prosecutor can file a protest with a lower court seeking retrial (reopening) of a legally effective judgment or with an upper level court for review if the judgment is not yet legally effective. Under the proposed amendments, Chinese prosecutors can also propose a new supervision method (jianyi) under which a prosecutor would propose to a court at the same level for the retrial of cases with legally effective judgments, mediated agreements, or arbitration decisions, so long as there is a newly discovered error, the case meets Article 198 conditions, or if a mediated agreement harms the public good. 164 Alternatively, the prosecutor could also ask the an upper level prosecutor to file a kansu. 165 The amendments also increase the parameters of supervision. To address the problem of collusion between litigants and mediation authorities, a new provision would allow prosecutors to protest (kansu) or to petition for retrial in the executions of any judgments, or to challenge any mediated outcome that may harm the public good. 166 The investigative authority of prosecutors would be increased to allow a prosecutor to investigate whether a protest (kansu) with the court at the next higher level or a proposal for retrial (jianyi) to the court at the same level is necessary. 167 The prosecutor would also be empowered to review court records, question the litigants, or investigate beyond the case. 168 Through these various amendments, the Chinese state would give itself a role as a litigant before the court to challenge results it does not like in cases of social significance.
CONCLUSION
The Chinese Communist Party at its 15th National Congress in 1997 set the first ten-year target for national economic and social development with a basic strategy of -governing the country 164 according to law and building a socialist country ruled by law.‖ 169 By the end of August 2011, the Chinese legislature had enacted 240 effective laws including the current constitution, 306 administrative regulations, and over 8,600 local regulations. 170 In the areas of court and legal procedures, Chinese legal reforms adopted some elements of the adversary system including party autonomy and burdens of proof. 171 But while the language of rights may have been easy to import, the process of rights assertion has been more difficult. Efforts to establish legal formality and legal markets in China have led to the dominance of technocracy and great disparity in access to justice. Concerns for social stability have led the Chinese state to retreat from formality and develop a multi-track civil dispute resolution system. For poor and rural residents, simplified procedures and informal mediation remain the preferred dispute resolution methods; 172 while litigant autonomy holds sway in the run-of-the-mill commercial litigation. But in socially significant cases, the Chinese state is heavily involved-both through greater control of the litigation by the court and through greater supervision of the courts.
Such a multi-track system, while born of necessity, may serve to defuse the potential of courts to serve democratic reforms. It follows from this view that China's legal system will focus more on efficiency than on participation by ordinary citizens, giving more weight to the state's view of justice than to the ordinary litigant. Indeed, just as China embarked on -socialism with Chinese characteristics,‖ we are also witnessing -rule of law with Chinese characteristics.‖ And the -rule of law with Chinese characteristics‖ means a multi-tracked approach to rendering justice-one that focuses on preserving harmony rather than adjudicating right from wrong, dispute resolution rather than readjustment of public norms.
And yet, the presence of the Chinese developmental state and -rule of law with Chinese characteristics‖ is inevitable. Therefore, the challenge for future legal reformers is to recognize the reality of a dominant state but work towards ways to incorporate and ensure citizens' voices into Chinese law and governance even within the structure of the dominant state. There are promising signs, such as in the area of increasing judicial transparency. The new revisions of the Civil Procedure Code would require that all judgments and judicial orders be made public and that the basis for the decision be explained in writing (New Articles 151, 153, and 155) . 173 Nevertheless, civil litigants must be given the freedom and opportunity to shape and formulate their own civil litigation before civil litigation can truly serve the democratic role of preserving citizen voices.
